Economists measure the cost of protection in terms of static efficiency, growth rates and firm-or industry-level productivity effects. This survey is devoted exclusively to the literature on the static efficiency. A key preliminary point to note is that estimates in this literature are not derived econometrically from pre-and post-liberalization data. Instead, they are based on simulations of partial-or general-equilibrium models that are parameterized using estimates from the literature and calibrated around a pre-liberalization base year.
I. "Small" Triangular Losses
The natural starting point for our purpose is Harry Johnson (1960) whose central message was that static costs of protection, measured as a proportion of GNP, are inevitably low. Tariffs give rise to the triangular efficiency losses whose magnitude can be summarized in the formula: (1) Cost of protection as a proportion of GNP = (½) α.ητ 2 where α denotes the imports-to-GNP ratio at the tariff-ridden equilibrium, η the absolute value of the arc elasticity of demand for imports as we move from protected to free-trade equilibrium, and τ the ad valorem tariff rate at the domestic price. Because α is usually well below 1, estimates of η revolve around 1 or 2, and τ 2 is the square of a number less than 1, calculations based on this formula are expected to yield small numbers.
Johnson's message was echoed by a number of empirical studies published during and around 1960s and summarized in Panagariya (2002) . These studies nearly uniformly found the cost of protection for different countries in different years to be no more than 1% of GNP. Many subsequent studies, which employed computable general-equilibrium models generated similar numbers, leading Richard Harris (1984) to remark, "It is well known that conventional calculations of the costs of protection give numbers which are quite small; often in the order of 0.5 to 2.0 percent of GNP. This result holds for almost all known studies based on the competitive neoclassical model, either partial or general equilibrium."
II. High Protection, High Costs
It is easy to show, however, that low costs of protection in the conventional model are not inevitable. The impression that these costs are low stems from calculations that have themselves been done for situations involving low initial tariffs. That small deviations from the optimum are accompanied by small losses is hardly surprising.
From formula (1), the cost of protection rises at an increasing rate with the tariff. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that high tariffs might lead to high costs. This is suggested to some degree by an early calculation by Arnold Harberger (1959) To appreciate fully the quantitative importance of the level of tariff, consider a prohibitive tariff in a two-good, endowments economy with endowments given by X 1 = 10 and X 2 = 40.
Denoting consumption by C 1 and C 2 , let preferences be represented by Cobb-Douglas utility
. Under autarky, the relative price of good 1 turns out to be 4. If the world 2 relative price of good 1 is 2 and trade is freed up, we obtain C 1 = 15 and C 2 = 30. The real income relative to autarky rises by 6.5 percent. Alternatively, if the world price of good 1 is 1, the country consumes 25 units of each good and the gain from free trade jumps to 25 percent of the autarky income!
Observe that parameters underlying these examples, except arguably the autarky tariff rate in the second example, are biased towards generating small rather than large effects. With no substitution possibilities in production, protection can lead to no misallocation of resources.
Likewise, Cobb-Douglas preferences exhibit demand elasticities of unity and limit substitution possibilities in consumption.
The implicit autarky tariff rate and free trade imports-to-GNP ratio in the first example are symmetric goods in the presence of increasing returns. Let labor be the only factor of production with total labor force in each economy L and production functions for the two goods X i = L i k (∞ > k > 1; i = 1, 2). Parameter k captures the scale effect with (k-1)/k representing the percentage decline in per-unit cost due to one percent increase in the output. Scale economies are external to the firm, validating the average-cost-pricing equilibrium. As before, the utility function is C 1
. As in Kindleberger (1968, Figure 3 .9), we can represent autarky and free-trade equilibriums by points A and T, respectively, in Figure 1 . 
Under autarky, each country devotes half of the total labor force to each sector with
The opening to trade leads each country to specialize in one product and allows the consumption of each good in each country to rise to L k /2. Correspondingly, the real income rises by Being based on two-good models, these examples exaggerate the gains from trade. In the first example, trade leads to the doubling of the scale while in the second one it leads to the doubling of product variety. Once we allow for many products following Paul Krugman's (1979) pioneering work, these effects will be ameliorated. These examples also compare autarky and free trade and do not inform us about the magnitudes of effects for small tariffs. The key question therefore is whether the effects in models with many products and low tariffs will be as small as in the conventional models.
The answer to this question is in the negative. Harris (1984) constructs a generalequilibrium model of the Canadian economy first assuming constant returns and perfect competition in all sectors and then allowing for firm-level scale economies and imperfect competition in a subset of the sectors. In 1976, the year for which the model is calibrated, Canadian tariffs ranged between 0 to 33 percent and averaged 11 percent. In the constant returns, perfect competition version of the model, the removal of Canadian tariffs generates no net welfare gains: efficiency gains are (coincidentally) exactly offset by the losses from the deterioration in the terms of trade. In the 5 version with economies of scale and imperfect competition, even after netting out the adverse terms of trade effects, the gain is 4.1 percent of GNP.
IV. Small Tariffs Leading to the Withdrawal of Products and High Costs
Paul Romer (1994) shows that when a seller has to incur a fixed cost of introducing a product into a market such as the cost of advertising or establishment of a service and parts supply network, small tariffs may lead to large losses in real incomes.
Romer's point is best illustrated with the help of Figure 2 , which depicts the market for a product that a foreign supplier is able to produce at a constant average and marginal cost. But because he must incur a fixed cost to introduce it into the market under consideration, the overall average cost is downward sloped. As drawn, the supplier just breaks even under free trade indicating that this is the last product imported at the margin that must incur fixed selling costs. The 6 introduction of even a tiny tariff in this setting leads to the complete withdrawal of the product, leading to the loss of the entire consumers' surplus represented by triangle APE.
Romer incorporates this idea into a simple model in which there is a single final good, produced using labor and differentiated inputs imported from abroad. The larger the number of available inputs, the lower the cost of production. Using specific parameter values, he shows that if the number of imported inputs is held fixed at its free-trade level, a 10 percent tariff lowers real income by 1 percent of GNP just as in the conventional analysis. But if products are allowed to disappear to ensure no loss to the last input imported, the cost rises to 19.81 percent
V. X-efficiency
Reacting to the low estimates of the cost of distortions during 1960s, Leibenstein (1966) offered the idea that distortions may result in larger costs if they reduce efficiency within the firm.
As Max Corden (1974) discusses systematically, this idea runs into difficulty, however, when applied on the economy-wide basis. For example, liberalization may lead to reduced profitability, increased managerial effort and hence improve X-efficiency in import-competing sectors. But symmetrically it will lead to reduced effort and X-efficiency in exportable sectors, making the net effect ambiguous.
Nevertheless, Joel Bergsman (1974) has gone on to build the losses from reduced Xefficiency under protection in his estimates. He employs a partial equilibrium model and assumes constant costs of production. He divide the import-competing sectors into two categories:
conventional sectors such as textiles and clothing that will survive the freeing of trade and modern sectors such as consumer durables that will be forced out of existence by increased competition.
High domestic costs under protection are identified with X-inefficiency in the former case and with allocative inefficiency in the latter. Bergsman estimates X-efficiency costs as a proportion of GNP In turn, Bhagwati (1982) has broadened the concept of rent seeking and measurement of the cost of protection to include the impact of what he has christened as Directly Unproductive Profitseeking (DUP) activities. In Bhagwati (1989) , he distinguishes between downstream DUP activities such as rent and revenue seeking and tariff and quota evasion that take place in response to an existing distortion and upstream DUP activities such as tariff and quota seeking that create distortions in the first place. He correctly notes that only downstream DUP activities should be considered in the measurement of the cost of protection since upstream DUP activities are the cause, not effect, of protection. Bhagwati (1989) argues that even downstream DUP costs may be smaller than the entire quota rent or tariff revenue for two reasons: DUP activities are unlikely to be perfectly competitive because the relatives of the licensing authority have a better chance of getting the license and the shadow prices of the resources themselves are below their respective market prices in the presence of the distortion. He concludes, however, that despite these caveats, the DUP literature strengthens the anti-protectionist hand.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper arrives at three conclusions. First, in the traditional neoclassical model, the static welfare costs of protection of tariffs that are 15 percent or less are unlikely to exceed 1 percent of GNP. Second, even within this model, high levels of protection can readily lead to losses nearing 10 percent of GNP. Finally, if we modify the standard model to allow for scale economies in production, fixed costs of introducing products into a market, X-efficiency, and downstream DUP activities, even low levels of protection can result in large deadweight losses.
